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Abstract 
It has long been supposed that preference judgments between sets of to-be-considered possibilities 
are made by means of initially winnowing down the most promising-looking alternatives to form 
smaller “consideration sets” (Howard, 1963; Wright & Barbour, 1977). In preference choices with 
>2 options, it is standard to assume that a “consideration set”, based upon some simple criterion, is 
established to reduce the options available. Inferential judgments, in contrast, have more frequently 
been investigated in situations in which only two possibilities need to be considered (e.g., which of 
these two cities is the larger?) Proponents of the “fast and frugal” approach to decision-making 
suggest that such judgments are also made on the basis of limited, simple criteria. For example, if 
only one of two cities is recognized and the task is to judge which city has the larger population, the 
recognition heuristic states that the recognized city should be selected. A multinomial processing 
tree model is outlined which provides the basis for estimating the extent to which recognition is used 
as a criterion in establishing a consideration set for inferential judgments between three possible 
options. 
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1. Introduction 
Research on consumer behavior and marketing has long made use of the concept of an 
“evoked” (Howard, 1963) or “consideration” set (Wright & Barbour, 1977) when consumers are 
making preference, and purchasing, decisions between the multiple brands available on the 
market. A typical assumption is that the formation of a consideration set is part of a multi-stage 
process ending in choice, a component of the choice process that relives what might otherwise be 
an excessive cognitive load upon the consumer (e.g., Bettman, 1979; Hauser & Wernerfeld, 
1990; Wright & Barbour, 1977). By reducing the number of options to be considered, the 
consumer limits the time and computational resource to be expended upon forming the 
preference or making the choice, in line with the concept of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1955) 
A similar attempt to describe human judgments and decision-making in a manner 
consistent with the assumption of boundedly-rational agents  is the “fast and frugal” heuristic 
framework advocated by Gigerenzer and colleagues (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hertwig & Pachur, 2011). 
This framework aims to provide both normative and descriptive accounts of how judgments are 
made in the real world, where time and computational resources may preclude optimizing 
strategies (e.g., multiple regression) which consult all possible sources of information and weight  
combinations of these appropriately to form the judgments made. For example, a heuristic 
known as “Take-the-Best” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) takes advantage of the fact that the 
majority of cues possessing  any degree of validity for a paired-choice criterion inference task 
are likely to point in the direction of the same option (e.g., when considering the relative size of 
two German cities,  considering whether the city has a soccer team in the major league and 
whether it is on the intercity line are likely to give similar indications that the city is reasonably 
substantial). Cues, or reasons to conclude in favor of a particular option, are searched in order of 
validity (defined as the relative frequency with which the cue predicts the criterion with respect 
to the reference class) until a cue is found that discriminates between the two options currently 
being considered – at which point comparison ceases and an inference is drawn. As an example, 
in considering the size of German cities, whether the city is the national capital has perfect 
validity (because Berlin is the largest city in Germany) but is not very discriminating (because 
Berlin is the only option to which the cue applies). Whether the city is a state capital is a less 
valid cue (if used as a cue, when considering all German cities with >100,000 inhabitants, it will 
succeed only 77% of the time) but it can be applied more frequently, so is more discriminating, 
than the “national capital” cue.  National capital status will be used as a cue when possible, 
without checking any other details, but when it cannot be used then other cues (perhaps 
including state capital status) will be consulted in descending order of validity (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). This framework has proved to be a profitable one in the domains to which it 
has been applied (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 2011), and has the cognitively desirable feature of being 
computational in nature, a feature missing from many other propositions in the literature of 
human judgement (e.g., the heuristics and biases programme; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 
1982) except insofar as they record deviations from a normative (typically Bayesian) model. 
However, the fast and frugal heuristic framework has largely concerned itself with accounting 
for data taken from tasks where the individual is asked to make a judgment between only two 
items (albeit often repeatedly, with the identity of the items varying).  
One of the most basic principles underlying the fast and frugal approach is the Recognition 
Principle, later formalized as the Recognition Heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and 
implemented in ACT-R (Marewski, & Mehlhorn, 2011; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). The RH 
acts as a stopping rule for more complex heuristics (e.g., Take-the-Best, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996) and states simply that, “If the task is to judge which of two options scores highest on a 
given criterion, and only one of the two options is recognized, infer that the recognized option 
scores highest on the criterion”. For example, the heuristic might be used to judge which of two 
cities has the larger population (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), which of two individuals is the 
wealthiest (Frosch, Beaman & McCloy, 2007) or which of two diseases occurs most frequently 
per year (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006).  
The heuristic is applied when the criterion in question is known to correlate positively with 
the probability of recognition (Volz, Schooler, Schubotz, Raab, Gigerenzer & von Cramon, 
2006), although the reverse inference can also be made in the unlikely event that the correlation 
is known to be negative (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; see also McCloy, Beaman, Frosch & 
Goddard, 2010, for an example of reversing the recognition-criterion correlation by inverting the 
question). In either case, the heuristic takes advantage of information latent in the environment to 
inform inference and minimize the amount of knowledge sought or retrieved from memory (or 
other, external sources) about the items in question prior to making a judgment. 
Two studies that expand the scope of investigation beyond looking simply at paired-
choices are those by Marewski, Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer (2010) and 
Frosch et al. (2007). Marweski et al. (2010) examined the success of different attempts to judge 
likelihood of winning electoral office amongst named politicians and Frosch et al. (2007) 
presented 3- or 4-alternatives to choose from in a wealth judgment task. Both of these studies 
examined the use of the Recognition Heuristic. Recognition would seem, at first blush, to be an 
appropriate basis on which to reduce a large number of possible options down to an evoked or 
consideration set of more tractable size. Indeed, in some circumstances, the distinction between 
criterion-inference judgments and the preference choices investigated in consumer choice studies 
may become blurred (e.g., subjects asked to indicate which politician they believe will win a 
given election (a criterion question), as in Marewski et al.’s (2010) data, are de facto also being 
asked which candidate they believe the public as a whole will prefer to win the election). 
The fast-and-frugal framework, and the RH in particular, have not been universally 
accepted as descriptive accounts of human inference, however (e.g., Hilbig & Richter, 2011; 
Newell, Weston & Shanks, 2002). Hilbig and colleagues, in particular, have drawn attention to 
the difficulty in identifying when recognition per se is used to  inform judgment rather than 
knowledge which accords with recognition (Hilbig, 2010; Hilbig, Erdfelder & Pohl, 2010; Hilbig 
& Pohl, 2008; Hilbig, Pohl & Bröder, 2009; Hilbig & Richter, 2011). Given the positive 
correlation between the probability of recognition and the criterion in question, it is inevitable 
that many of the other cues that could in principle be consulted (even if only one of the items is 
recognized) will result in the same inference as recognition alone. The difficulty in assessing the 
RH as a descriptive model of human inference then becomes one of determining when 
recognition is the only cue used. Choosing the single recognized option in the inference task is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, basis for concluding that the RH has been employed. One way of 
addressing this problem is applying a multinomial processing tree (MPT) model (e.g., the one 
proposed by Hilbig et al., 2010). MPT models assume sequential, independent operations which 
can be expressed as a tree structure, with alternative processes at each branch point each 
associated with a parameter that represents the probability of traversing that particular branch. 
The tree structure terminates with an observable outcome, and the models are compared to the 
data by estimating the best-fitting parameters and comparing the frequency counts of each 
outcome in experimental data to the expected outcomes given the parameters estimated.  
As a concrete example, consider the position in a two-alternative forced choice task (2-
AFC) where the subject is asked to indicate which of the two options scores highest on the 
criterion of interest. Here, three trees need to be drawn. In the scenario described by the first tree, 
the subject recognizes neither of the options and is forced to guess between them. There are 
therefore only two possible outcomes, a correct guess or an incorrect guess, and hence only two 
branches to the tree. The probability of a correct guess (the branch leading to the frequency count 
of correct answers) is associated with the parameter g, and the probability of an incorrect guess is 
therefore given by (1-g). Where guessing is truly random, g=.5. The scenario described by the 
third tree is similarly of little direct interest to the study of the RH. Here, the subject recognizes 
both options and uses knowledge to choose between them, with probability correct given by 
parameter b (“knowledge validity”) and the same two-branch tree-structure as previously. This 
tree is potentially open to expansion, assuming that suitable candidate knowledge processes can 
be identified. Of more immediate interest is the second decision tree, which describes the 
scenario in which exactly one of the two options is recognized. Here, there are four possible 
outcomes: the recognized item might be chosen or not, and the choice might be correct or 
incorrect. There are also multiple ways in achieving these outcomes.  
Suppose the RH is applied uncritically, then the probability that the RH produces the 
correct answer is given by parameter a (“recognition validity”). However, whether the RH is 
applied uncritically is itself governed by a parameter, r. Thus, the probability the RH is applied 
and is correct is given by r.a and the probability the RH is applied but results in an incorrect 
inference is given by r.(1-a). If the RH is not applied uncritically, then the inference that the 
recognized item is correct might be made by the alternative route of applying knowledge. The 
probability that this occurs is the joint probability of the RH being valid, knowledge being valid, 
and knowledge being used, given by (1-r).b.a. The routes by which decisions might be made 
according to this MPT model are given exhaustively in Table 1. 
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From this table, it is clear that MPT models are well-suited to answering the question of 
the extent to which the RH is employed in any given 2-AFC inference task. Estimation of the 
best-fitting set of parameters from the data provides the most likely rate of application of the RH 
in terms of the r parameter. This can be done across the sample of all subjects within the 
experiment or, where a sufficiently large data-set is available for estimations to be made on an 
individual basis, it can be done per individual. This may be useful if, for example, r and a are not 
independent for some participants (see, e.g., Beaman et al., 2010). However, because of the 
limited data available, in the study reported below only estimation across the full dataset was 
attempted. 
1.1 Multi-Alternative Inferences  
As already intimated, not all criterion inferences involve choosing between only two 
alternatives. Frosch et al. (2007), for example,  presented 3- or 4-alternatives to choose from in a 
wealth judgment task. Marweski et al. (2010) likewise examined the incidence of RH use when 
judging likelihood of electoral success amongst named politicians. Theoretical analyses of the 
success of the RH as a normative theory under these circumstances are also provided by 
McCloy, Beaman & Smith (2008). Both a priori theoretical analyses and empirical studies rely 
upon the presumption that there are independent processing stages in which N alternative options 
are reduced to a smaller number from which to choose, but the decision-making processes 
employed to reduce the number of alternative options may differ from those employed to choose 
from amongst those options. This situation parallels one in the literature on consumer choice, in 
which it is assumed that a “consideration set” is initially formed from within all the options 
available (Howard, 1963; Wright & Barbour, 1977). These circumstances also lend themselves 
to modeling by means of MPTs, where consideration sets may be invoked in multi-alternative 
inference and the nature of the criteria applied in order to form such a consideration set, as well 
as to make an ultimate judgment is open to empirical enquiry. The suggestion made here is that 
where more than two options are available from which to choose, a single simple judgment, 
perhaps applying the recognition principle as means of forming a consideration set, might 
precede subsequent – possibly more complex – knowledge-based inference (Marewski et al., 
2010, make reference to a process of “elimination by recognition”, whereas here the emphasis is 
more on selection by recognition). Whether this occurs, and whether – if so – the process 
resembles in any way the application of the RH, is an open question.  
2. Material & methods.  
To model multi-alternative inferences using MPTs, an appropriate data-set is required and 
tree structures representing the structure of the model must be constructed. Here, the example of 
3-AFC inference is explored using data from Frosch et al. (2007) in a study in which subjects 
were asked to indicate which of three names taken from the Sunday Times rich list (an annual 
compilation of the richest individuals in the UK) was the wealthiest. 27 such names were chosen 
and, from within this group, were randomly 22 lists of three names each were produced by 
random selection. 26 subjects were then each given the same series of three names to choose 
from per trial and were asked to indicate which name they thought was the wealthiest. They were 
then re-presented with all the names and asked to indicate which names they had known prior to 
the beginning of the experiment. As with 2-AFC, the trees describing scenarios in which either 
all the options or none of the options are recognized are relatively uninteresting, being governed 
purely by single guessing or knowledge parameters (g and b, respectively).  
 
2.1 The structure of 3-AFC judgments. 
For 3-AFC scenarios in which one item is recognized, a plausible tree structure is given in 
Figure 1. The tree structure when one item from three is recognized differs from the 
corresponding structure when one item is recognized in a 2-AFC task. As shown in Figure 1, 
there is an extra step with 3-AFC when the RH is not applied, knowledge is valid (i.e., will 
provide the correct inference) but the RH is not valid (will provide an incorrect inference). The 
reasons for this can readily be discerned as follows: If knowledge is inaccurate and is used in 
preference to the RH, then it will always lead to a false choice, either of the recognized item (if 
recognition is also an invalid cue) or one of the unrecognized items (if recognition is a valid 
cue), as in the 2-AFC situation. However, if knowledge is valid then this knowledge must be 
either that the one recognized item is high on the criteria or that the recognized item is low on the 
criteria. If the former, the recognized item will be chosen, if the latter then it will be excluded 
from further analysis. If both knowledge and recognition provide valid cues, then the recognized 
item must be the correct item and it will be chosen. If, however, recognition is not a valid cue 
then the correct item must be one of the two unrecognized options: hence there is an extra 
guessing stage to choose between these two. In terms of the equations presented in Table 1, the 
conditional probability of guessing correctly when following this particular branch of the tree 
can be expressed as: (1-r1).b1.(1-a1).g1. 
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A similar logic can be applied to construct the tree structure for scenarios where two of the 
three options were recognized. The decision tree for the scenario when two items (out of three) 
are recognized is more complex than when only one item is recognized (Figure 2). Here, the RH 
inclusion rule is explicitly distinguished from the RH itself since, although both are instances of 
the recognition principle, it is not immediately clear that they are identical. The RH inclusion 
rule operates to winnow down the number of options under active consideration to a 
consideration set defined in terms of whether the items were recognized or not. Thus the RH 
inclusion rule operates along the recognition principle, as does the RH, but unlike the RH is only 
the first step in establishing – by a longer chain of inference – which of the items scores most 
highly on the criterion. It is an empirical question whether the RH inclusion rule and the RH are 
applied at equivalent rates amongst the same group of subjects attempting the same criterion 
judgment task. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how inferences may be made on the basis of recognition, knowledge, 
or recognition plus knowledge when three items are presented but recognition is incomplete. 
Under these circumstances, of course, the chosen item may also be either recognized or 
unrecognized and tracing the relevant branch of the decision tree gives this information also 
(e.g., if valid knowledge is used and recognition is also a valid cue then the correct choice made 
must be the choice of the recognized option). 
When the inclusion rule is applied, recognition may be a valid or an invalid cue. If it is 
invalid, then straightforwardly, the choice of item must be incorrect as only the two recognized 
items are under consideration. If, however, recognition is a valid cue then correct inference is 
still not guaranteed as a choice must be made between the two recognized items. If the inclusion 
rule is not applied, then the knowledge about the two recognized items consulted instead may 
also be either valid or invalid. If it is valid and recognition is also a valid cue, that is to say the 
correct item is one of the two recognized items, then a correct inference is made because valid 
knowledge of the two items is sufficient to choose between them. If the inclusion rule is invalid, 
then valid knowledge must be of a different type – knowledge that neither of the recognized 
items is correct. In this case too, however, correct inference is guaranteed. Following the same 
lines of argument, if knowledge is invalid then an incorrect choice is made regardless of whether 
recognition is valid; that is, regardless of whether the invalid choice is of a recognized or 
unrecognized item. 
3. Results. 
The best-fitting parameters for the model were estimated from Frosch et al.’s (2007) 3-
AFC study using MultiTree software (Moshagen, 2010). “Guessing” parameters for situations in 
which neither knowledge nor recognition could be employed were set to produce chance-level 
accuracy (i.e., g = .33, g1 = 0.5). An initial model assumed a single value for knowledge validity 
to determine – based on knowledge – whether one of two recognized items was correct and also 
which of these two recognized items was the correct option (i.e., on Figure 2, b3 = 1.0). For this 
model, recognition and knowledge validities were separately estimated for each recognition 
scenario (recognize 0, 1, 2 or 3) as there are reasons to suppose that knowledge validity should 
vary as a function of the number of items recognized (e.g., Beaman et al., 2010; Smith, Beaman 
& McCloy, 2011). Estimating all parameters other than the “guessing” parameters, g and g1, a 
goodness-of-fit test shows that the best-fitting version of this model nevertheless produced 
expected results which differed significantly from those observed, G
2
=11.01, df=3, p = .01.  
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A second model, assuming a decision-point (with validity b2) that one of the recognized 
items – based on knowledge – was the correct item and a further decision-point (again, based on 
knowledge but with a different validity, b3) produced expected results that did not differ 
significantly from those observed, G
2
=1.05, df=2, p=.59. Knowledge validity when all three 
items were recognized was estimated as 0.47 and when one item of the three was recognized 
knowledge validity was 0.56. Knowledge validity for correctly realizing – based on knowledge  
– that one of the two recognized items was the correct choice was high, at 0.91, but choosing 
between these two items once this decision was made was difficult, with validity of choices 
estimated at 0.30. This model was defined as the “basline model” against which variants with 
different parameter constraints were then compared, to determine whether the outputs of such 
models where parameters were clamped, or otherwise constrained to certain values, were 
statistically distinguishable from these baseline model in which more free parameters were 
permitted.  
Interestingly, for this model, the probabilities r1 and r2 that the RH and the RH-inclusion 
rule were employed (Figures 1 and 2) were estimated as .64 and .63 respectively, and the 
validities of these two rules were also estimated as being very similar, a1 (RH validity) = .72 and 
a2 (inclusion rule validity) = .73. Constraining these two rules and their validities to take the 
same values resulted in a model where a=.73 and r=.63 which did not differ significantly from 
the baseline model, ΔG2 = .19, df = 2, p = .91, nor from the data, G2=1.25, df=4, p=.88. For the 
3-AFC situation, therefore, it appears that there is no discernible difference between using the 
RH to guide choice when only one item is recognized and using the RH-inclusion rule to form a 
consideration set which is subsequently informed by knowledge. Full parameter values for this 
version of the model are given in Table 3, a comparison of the model to the data in terms of 
observed and expected frequencies with which recognized and unrecognized items were chosen 
either correctly or incorrectly is given in Table 2. Although over-fitting the data is a legitimate 
concern, and one which may be fuelled by observation of the close fits between expected and 
obtained results here, it is worth noting that – like standard hypothesis testing – a failure to 
provide a good fit given certain assumptions (e.g. that r=1.0) may be as informative as obtaining 
a good fit, and it is on this basis that the G
2
 goodness-of-fit statistic is applied. Future work will 
further address this issue, for example by means of some form of cross-validiation, or 
accumulative prediction error akin to Bayesian model selection and the method of minimum 
description length (Wagenmakers, Grünwald & Steyvers, 2006). 
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Finally, models in which choice of the recognized item was taken as an index of RH-use 
(i.e., r1=.78), differed significantly from the best-fitting (baseline) model, ΔG
2
=5.15, df=1, 
p=.02, but not from the data, G
2
=6.2, df=3, p=.1. However, if the same exercise is repeated for 
the RH-inclusion rule, the resulting model differs both from the best-fitting, baseline model, 
ΔG2=13.59, df = 1,  p=.0002, and from the data, G2=14.65, df=3, p=.002. Using RH-adherence 
rate as an index of the RH-inclusion rule is therefore likely to be misleading. 
4. Discussion 
The modeling results reported here indicate the viability of applying the recognition 
principle as a means of forming a consideration set in criterion judgment as well as preference 
judgment, when there are more than two alternatives to consider. The particular tree structures 
proposed for an independent series of decisions can also be fit to the data with estimated 
parameters providing expected results that do not differ significantly from those observed in the 
data (Table 2). Although the particular data-set modeled here (relative wealth judgments) clearly 
require  a criterion judgment, the distinction between criterion and preference judgments is less 
distinct with other stimuli. For example, Marewski et al. (2010)  apply the RH to understanding 
judgments about the relative success of candidates in German elections. Although this is most 
obviously a criterion judgment (“who is most likely to win?”), it can also be framed as a 
preference judgment (“who is the best candidate?”) whilst still potentially meeting the pre-
requisites for applying the recognition heuristic or recognition principle (“infer that the 
recognized option scores highest on the criterion”). Elucidating the means by which multi-
alternative inferences may be made, even if the expansion is the relatively modest one from 2-
AFC to 3-AFC, helps indicate where there are possible similarities between preference choice 
(where multiple alternatives are frequently presented) and criterion inference (where, typically, 
paired choices are presented, as in the “city size” task popularized by Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
(1996).  
One interesting feature that became apparent when modeling these data was the need for 
multiple different parameters to represent knowledge validity, if not recognition validity. This 
both supports Smith et al.’s (2011) arguments that knowledge validity should vary as a function 
of the number of items recognized (see also Beaman et al., 2010) and highlights the need for 
different types of knowledge to be consulted to choose that the correct item is one of the 
recognized set (e.g., b2) and which member of the recognized set the correct item may be (e.g., 
b3; b2 ≠ b3).  
The model also indicates that, at  least for the data-set considered here, there may be little 
or no difference between the application and validity of a “recognition inclusion rule” and the 
recognition heuristic per se. This is something of a surprise as, a priori, one would assume that a 
recognition inclusion rule might be employed, as a cognitive short-cut, even more frequently 
than the RH itself. However, it may simply be that the 3-AFC was too similar to 2-AFC  for any 
differences to become apparent. The data also  show that recognition adherence rate is not a good 
measure of use of the recognition principle when more than one item is recognized and a 
recognized item is chosen. The resulting model, where r2 is set at the adherence rate, differs 
significantly from both the baseline, best-fitting model and the data. Setting r1, the incidence of 
employing the RH,  also produces a model that differs significantly from the baseline model 
although, in this case, both models fit the data. 
Finally, it is worth noting some limitations of the current modeling approach. Like all 
formal approaches, it relies upon a number of background assumptions. The need for multiple 
parameters and the relative independence of certain parameters have already been alluded to, but 
of equal concern is the lack of an underlying process model. The framework as it currently exists 
blurs the boundaries between the existence of cognitive processes and their efficacy. For 
example, the MPT model treats the probability that recognition is used a cue as an outcome 
probability, qualitatively identical to the probability that recognition is a valid cue. The challenge 
is to provide an underlying, computable, process model which both draws clear distinctions 
between the two and shows how, and when, knowledge is consulted.  
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Recognize 0: g (correct) 
(1-g): (incorrect) 
Recognize 1: r.a (choose recognized, correct) 
r(1-a) (choose recognized, incorrect) 
(1-r)b.a (choose recognized, correct) 
(1-r)b(1-a) (choose unrecognized, correct) 
(1-r)(1-b)a (choose unrecognized, incorrect) 
(1-r)(1-b)(1-a) (choose recognized, incorrect) 
Recognize 2: b (correct) 
(1-b) (incorrect) 
 
Table 1: Probabilities of choosing correctly or incorrectly via different routes of three simple 
decision trees. The probability of arriving at the end point of any particular branch of a decision-
tree is the product of the parameters associated with each branch-point. 
 
  Observed Expected 
Recognize 0:   
Correct 40 35 
Incorrect 65 70 
Recognize 1:   
Correct (recog) 83 84.40 
Incorrect (recog) 25 23.69 
Correct (¬recog) 10 9.87 
Incorrect (¬recog) 16 16.19 
Recognize 2:   
Correct (recog) 79 77.81 
Incorrect (recog) 62 62.79 
Correct (¬recog) 14 14.32 
Incorrect (¬recog) 4 4 
Recognize 3:   
Correct 81 81 
Incorrect 93 93 
 
Table 2: The frequency of responses tabulated according to whether they were correct or not, and 
whether the option chosen was recognized or not. Observed responses are taken directly from the 
data of Frosch et al. (2007), expected responses are the frequencies of responses within those 
particular categories given a model with the tree structures shown in Figures 1 and 2 and the 
parameters given in Table 3. 
 
 Free Parameters: 
Probability applying recognition principle  
r1 (RH) = r2 (inclusion rule) .63 (.05) 
Recognition validity for RH and recognition 
inclusion rule 
 
a1=a2 .73 (.03) 
Knowledge validity  
b1 (1 item recognized) .56 (.11) 
b2 (2 items recognized) .91 (.05) 
b3 (choice between 2 recognized items) .47 (.04) 
b4 (3 items recognized) .30 (.17) 
 
Table 3. Parameter values for the version of the 3-AFC model fit to the data in Table 2. Standard 
errors for all of the estimates are given in parentheses. All g (guessing) values were fixed at 
chance. 
Figure Legends. 
 
Figure 1. A 3-AFC decision tree indicating possible processing paths leading to correct or 
incorrect criterion inferences when exactly one item from three is recognized. 
 
Figure 2. A 3-AFC decision tree indicating possible processing paths leading to correct or 
incorrect criterion inferences when exactly two items from three are recognized 
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